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Engagement on risk and uncertainty – lessons from coastal regions of Fukushima 
Prefecture, Japan after the 2011 nuclear disaster? 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper uses the case study of the south-east coast of Fukushima Prefecture in Japan to 
draw lessons for risk communication under situations of high uncertainty and conditions of 
varying trust. Based on an existing field of research into the social and ethical aspects of 
governing risks around environmental radioactivity, empirical qualitative material collected in 
Fukushima Prefecture over 2014 and 2015 is analysed around three key questions: who is 
undertaking risk communication and how they are perceived (in particular their motivations 
and perceived competence); what is the purpose of engagement with citizens and stakeholders 
on risk and uncertainty (i.e. whether it is to ‘convince’ people or allow them to come to their 
own informed decision); and whether risk communication may be considered responsive to 
the needs of the affected populations. The findings are then applied to Kasperson’s (2014) 
four questions for the future of risk communication in order to assess their wider implications. 
Particular attention is paid to how the individual or institution conveying the risk message is 
perceived, and in whose interests risk communication is undertaken. 
 
Keywords: environmental sociology; Fukushima nuclear accident; qualitative research; risk 
communication; risk governance. 
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Engagement on risk and uncertainty – lessons from coastal regions of Fukushima 1 
Prefecture, Japan after the 2011 nuclear disaster? 2 
 3 
1. Introduction 4 
 5 
On 11 March 2011, a powerful earthquake and tsunami off north-east Japan left over 17,000 6 
people either dead or missing. Cooling systems at the Fukushima Dai'ichi nuclear power plant 7 
(FDNPP) were taken offline. The resulting overheats and hydrogen explosions released 8 
radioactive matter over the land and sea of Fukushima Prefecture and beyond. For fuller 9 
overviews of the nuclear disaster and subsequent radioactive contamination, see Wakeford 10 
(2011) and Saito et al (2015) respectively. 11 
 12 
The nuclear disaster particularly affected Fukushima’s coastal corridor, known as Hamadori. 13 
Many of the approximately 154,000 people evacuated due to radioactivity were from 14 
Hamadori. Whilst remediation is underway, areas remain where residents will have long-term 15 
difficulties returning (annual air dose exposure estimated over 50 milliSieverts/year). Sites for 16 
storing waste generated by remediation are still being secured (Ministry of the Environment, 17 
2015). Accommodation of displaced persons and decontamination has also been required 18 
outwith evacuated areas (Kawazoe et al, 2014). Radioactive contamination of soil and 19 
seawater – and associated concerns over health effects from contaminated produce – led to 20 
restrictions on Fukushima produce. This is particularly significant given the importance of 21 
agriculture and fisheries to the prefecture. Despite gradually returning to sale if within 22 
monitoring limits, anxiety about the ‘safety’ of Fukushima produce remains (Buesseler et al, 23 
2011). There have been suggestions of tension between evacuees and residents of 24 
communities they have relocated to over differences in compensation (Saito and Slodkowski, 25 
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2014), and of Fukushima residents suffering psychological distress or stigmatisation 26 
(Edwards, 2013). Whilst it is impossible to discuss each of these issues within a single paper, 27 
it is important to note governance of and communication about risk associated with 28 
environmental radioactivity comes against a larger backdrop of societal change following the 29 
FDNPP disaster. 30 
 31 
This paper uses data collected in Iwaki City, a coastal municipality south of FDNPP, to 32 
evaluate opportunities and challenges for enacting the risk communication principles 33 
proposed by Kasperson (2014). Kasperson argues the design and implementation of risk 34 
communication practice seems little changed over recent decades, with more pluralistic and 35 
deliberative modes of communication now required to respond to declining societal trust and 36 
ongoing difficulties in communicating uncertainty. Kasperson argues for risk communication 37 
to be (a) more ambitious and sustained over time; (b) broadened to encompass values and 38 
lifestyles in risk issues; (c) more aware of which uncertainties matter in risk terms and which 39 
can be reduced; and (d) cognisant of the effect of limited trust on the nature of communication. 40 
Iwaki provides a good test case for Kasperson’s principles given the significance of 41 
uncertainty and trust in the area post-disaster. Iwaki was not evacuated but did receive 42 
radioactive contamination. The fisheries vital to its coastal villages economically, socially and 43 
culturally were suspended (Wada et al, 2013). Risk communication in Iwaki must thus 44 
address uncertainties from both land (decontamination, air-based monitoring) and sea (effects 45 
on fisheries, indeterminacies engendered by flows of water across spatial boundaries). Restart 46 
of coastal and deep-sea fisheries is also contingent on trust. This entails fishers trusting the 47 
FDNPP situation is under control with no further leakage, and buyers trusting marine produce 48 
is not harmful. Post-disaster Iwaki may thus yield lessons for communicating risk under a 49 
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situation of major and potentially irreversible environmental change, one where socially and 50 
culturally valued practices are affected as well as economic activity. 51 
 52 
2. Risk communication, environmental radioactivity and Fukushima 53 
 54 
We first clarify key terms. Following Arvai (2014), we take ‘communication’ to mean not 55 
correcting misunderstandings or aligning different views of risk with dominant ideological 56 
framings, but rather a two-way dialogue for balancing differing views of risk in decision-57 
making. So ‘communicating’ risk about radioactivity in Iwaki ought to mean listening to – 58 
and acting on – the concerns of citizens and stakeholders as well as information provision. 59 
Likewise, we acknowledge from Bradbury (1989) that the term ‘perceived risk’ may imply 60 
stakeholder or citizen views of risk are only ‘mere’ perceptions. As Oughton (2013: 22) 61 
explains referring to Drottz-Sjöberg and Persson (1993), ‘perception of risks is complex and it 62 
is a mistake to dismiss public anxiety towards radiation risks as being "irrational" or "wrong"’. 63 
We hence understand ‘risk perception’ as how any person - citizen, stakeholder, ‘expert’ or 64 
otherwise – evaluates risk. For clarity, we broadly define ‘stakeholders’ as those with an 65 
interest in, and/or having to make decisions themselves about, living and working within post-66 
disaster radioactive contamination. 67 
 68 
Radiation is of course real and potentially harmful, not simply an ethical or moral issue. Yet 69 
perceptions of environmental radioactivity can be complex, involving significant value 70 
dimensions or emotional investment. Oughton (2013) provides a comprehensive overview of 71 
the breadth of concerns that may be at play in discussions around post-contamination 72 
remediation, which can be summarised into three points. First, alongside dose reduction, 73 
social and psychological factors such as level of personal choice and control, familiarity, 74 
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closeness, and the distribution of risks versus benefits all inform perception of risk from 75 
radiation. Second, the possibility to carry out voluntary actions or increase understanding and 76 
control may be perceived as positive by both citizens and stakeholders, whereas risk 77 
management measures viewed as disruptive, infringing upon liberty or restricting normal 78 
practices may be received negatively. And third, communication policies showing sensitivity 79 
to these socio-psychological factors stand greater chance of success (Oughton, 2013). 80 
Moreover, even seemingly objective ‘expert’ risk taker or assessor (scientists, governors, 81 
operators) risk perceptions may reflect emotions, cultural context, personal identity or their 82 
own exposure to the risk (McKechnie, 2003; Sato, 2014; Kastenberg, 2015). 83 
 84 
Turcanu et al (2016) hence believe traditional societal governing modes – e.g. nation-state-85 
level representative party democracy, ‘objective’ science, education within disciplinary 86 
boundaries – may not encompass the full range of moral positions around what is an 87 
‘acceptable’ level of risk from nuclear technology. Even if the knowledge base for evaluating 88 
nuclear risk was agreed, differing opinions on acceptability of the risk would thus likely exist 89 
(Turcanu et al, 2016). Pidgeon (2014) argues risk communication researchers and 90 
practitioners need to take seriously values and citizen deliberation, given the complexity of 91 
contemporary technological and environmental hazards and the ever-broadening scales over 92 
which people may be exposed to risk. Recent contributions to this journal on Fukushima 93 
likewise recognise the effect of moral emotions on risk perceptions (Taebi and van der Poel, 94 
2014) and the need to imagine problems stretching into the future due to long timescales over 95 
which disaster recovery and remediation necessarily occur (Westerdahl, 2014; Lofquist, 2015). 96 
Moving towards governing radioactivity risk in practice, Fahlquist and Roeser (2015) identify 97 
a lack of trust or a sense of hopelessness as key barriers to communication that is sensitive to 98 
emotions and values. 99 
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 100 
In sum, for national, regional and/or municipal authorities ultimately responsible for 101 
regulation and remediation of environmental radioactivity to lead ‘better’ decision-making 102 
processes and outcomes, attention needs to be paid to drivers of public and stakeholder 103 
understanding and perceptions of what is an appropriate course of action. It is the 104 
opportunities to enact such decision-making in practice – and implications for risk 105 
communication more widely – that this paper assesses. 106 
 107 
3. Methodology 108 
 109 
Given these complexities in environmental radioactivity risk perception, a qualitative 110 
approach was adopted. Stakeholders were asked in open-ended in-depth interviews to talk 111 
about life in Iwaki and Fukushima and discuss their role in relation to post-accident 112 
environmental radioactivity. This focus on participants’ own life contexts and narratives has 113 
value in explaining how exactly people understand risk for complex issues like nuclear power 114 
(Henwood et al, 2010). Chase (2005) adds that narratives represent – and give researchers 115 
insight into - a particular social context. Working in-depth and intensively with a small 116 
number of key informants therefore offers analytical purchase on how an issue is understood 117 
within a particular area or culture. 118 
 119 
For as deep an understanding as possible, a small number of people covering key sectors on 120 
the Fukushima coast were thus selected rather than a larger sample with more limited 121 
explanatory power. 35 people were interviewed over summer 2014 and 2015, encompassing 122 
prefectural (i.e. regional) government specialists in land-based and marine radiation 123 
monitoring; university professors researching human dimensions of the nuclear accident; local 124 
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politicians concerned with the effects of the accident; managers of business organisations 125 
affected by radioactivity (fisheries cooperatives); and affected stakeholders/informed citizens 126 
with less direct influence over decision-making processes (fishers and fisheries cooperative 127 
administration staff). Most interviews were conducted in Iwaki itself, however some took 128 
place in Fukushima City to access relevant government or research expertise. Due to potential 129 
ethical sensitivities around a traumatic event like the March 2011 disasters, an intermediary 130 
local government contact recruited participants less empowered to influence decision-making 131 
processes. More empowered stakeholders (e.g. university professors, high-level regional 132 
government employees) were recruited through a combination of existing contacts from 133 
previous research, snowball sampling, and internet search of relevant media outlets to identify 134 
institutions involved in communicating environmental radioactivity risk. 135 
 136 
All interviews were in Japanese and audio-recorded. Whilst there was no formal interview 137 
guide, all interviews began by asking participants to narrate their experiences of living and 138 
working in Fukushima and Iwaki. This built rapport with interviewees before discussing 139 
radiation specifically, and also gleaned contextual information about life in the area. Each 140 
interview then aimed to cover the broad topics of the interviewee’s role post-disaster with 141 
regard to risk communication and management; their feelings on how successful the 142 
governance of risk from radiation had been thus far; and what they thought the main 143 
difficulties remaining around risk management and communication were for Fukushima 144 
radiation. With the intention of letting participants raise issues they perceived as important 145 
rather than forcing the discussion towards what the researchers assumed to be significant, 146 
these topics were however deployed as starting points for discussion rather than specific 147 
questions. Following Henwood et al (2010), in the main the interviewers let the interviewees 148 
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take the lead in steering the conversation. When necessary, to keep the discussion flowing, 149 
follow-up questions were asked to further probe issues the interviewees raised. 150 
  151 
The interviews were simultaneously transcribed and translated into English. Although both 152 
authors who undertook the interviews are proficient in Japanese, for accuracy English 153 
translations were double-checked with an additional native speaker separate from the research. 154 
However, as a guard against analysing the translation rather than the ‘original’ (Smith, 1996) 155 
the Japanese-language recordings in the main formed the basis for analysis. This also meant 156 
interpretation progressed as far as possible in the same language to that in which the original 157 
research was undertaken (Gawlewicz, 2016). The data was analysed qualitatively, identifying 158 
emerging themes through an iterative process of listening for concepts mentioned by 159 
participants in the interviews and then refining or developing these themes via subsequent re-160 
listening. Such iterative analysis is widely used in energy and environmental social research 161 
(e.g. Kempton et al, 2005; Parkhill et al, 2014), and gives flexibility to start with issues 162 
participants themselves identify as being important, rather than imposing researchers’ own 163 
interpretative frameworks on the data. Both authors identified broadly similar themes through 164 
separate analysis. However, as our use of this more grounded approach involves each 165 
researcher drawing out their own ideas (which may not be identical) from the data as a whole 166 
rather than assigning data into pre-determined categories, it was not possible or arguably 167 
suitable to quantify inter-rater reliability via Cohen’s Kappa or similar (Henwood and 168 
Pidgeon, 2012). In Section 5 we reflect on these challenges around reliability and language. 169 
 170 
The rest of this paper discusses themes the authors identified – trust, uncertainty, traceability 171 
of radiation, and socio-cultural dimensions of risk. Given the small and intensive sample size, 172 
it should be reiterated that our aim is to draw wider lessons for how publics and stakeholders 173 
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perceive risks and decision-making around environmental radioactivity, rather than offering a 174 
complete characterisation of risk perception in Iwaki or Fukushima per se. With this in mind, 175 
we structure our analysis around three broader questions: who undertakes risk communication 176 
and management on the Fukushima coast and how they are perceived; how these 177 
communication efforts address uncertainty and complexity and to what end; and whether the 178 
content and nature of risk communication is responsive to citizen and stakeholder 179 
requirements. Where appropriate, links to existing studies are made to illustrate how our 180 
findings either build on or challenge recent research. 181 
 182 
4. Data and analysis 183 
 184 
4.1. Who is ‘communicating’, and how are they perceived? 185 
 186 
Interviewees reported a range of information sources – or points of contact for discussion – on 187 
risk from radiation. These included national government departments (e.g. Fisheries Agency 188 
of Japan), nuclear plant operator Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO); the prefectural 189 
government (especially fisheries and environmental sections); prefectural or municipal 190 
fisheries cooperatives; researchers working for universities both within and outwith the 191 
prefecture; and non-governmental organisations concerned with measuring environmental 192 
radioactivity. 193 
 194 
More than any differences in data on radioactivity itself provided by these various 195 
organisations, what came across in the interviews were differences in the perceived 196 
trustworthiness of these communicating actors. The significance of trust in assessment of 197 
risks associated with high techno-scientific complexity is widely acknowledged (e.g. Wynne, 198 
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1992; Pellizzoni, 2003). Within this we focus on two factors contributing to trust in the 199 
institution managing risk: perceived exposure to risks versus benefits; and perceived 200 
competence. 201 
 202 
Firstly, perceived exposure to risks versus benefits. Both the fisheries research station in 203 
Onahama (operated by Fukushima Prefecture) and the fisheries cooperative narrated the 204 
process of restarting fisheries by explaining fishers’ livelihoods could still be at stake even if 205 
fisheries were restarted: 206 
 207 
There were two feelings in the fishing community. One was that they wanted to fish, 208 
they had a strong feeling for fishing, so no matter what they wanted to fish. The other 209 
was that, it wasn’t that they didn’t want to fish, but they worried that radioactivity 210 
from the nuclear plant would flow out to sea, be picked up by fish and then be passed 211 
on to consumers. 212 
 213 
(fisheries resources manager, Fukushima Prefecture Fisheries Research Station, 214 
Onahama) 215 
 216 
In Iwaki itself the radiation level in the air is low, there are no particular issues. A 217 
large proportion of the fish we catch, only a very small proportion are over the 218 
contamination level. I know people look at Fukushima as being a dangerous place but 219 
it’s not, it’s quite safe, we are eating safe food and we are actually producing safe 220 
food. 221 
11 
 
 222 
(Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations project 223 
manager, Iwaki fisheries building) 224 
 225 
The fishers’ ultimate objective is clearly restarting commercial fisheries and the life they had 226 
before the disaster. Yet doing so too quickly could equally back-fire and jeopardise their 227 
livelihood if they are seen to be responsible for exposing consumers to contaminated fish. 228 
Small-scale coastal fishers thus have a vested interest in restarting fisheries in a manner 229 
perceived as ‘responsible’. This is compounded by the fact they and their families live in the 230 
area and may themselves end up consuming contaminated fish if monitoring is not 231 
sufficiently stringent. For reasons like this, people within institutions may come to be viewed 232 
as ‘locals’ with a personal and physical stake in the outcomes of radiation monitoring 233 
processes, even if only to ensure the sustainability of their businesses. Indeed, this idea of 234 
embeddedness within the setting as an indicator of the sincerity of institutions’ motives 235 
repeatedly emerged when participants were asked how they communicated information on 236 
environmental radioactivity: 237 
 238 
For people who don’t eat the fish, it seems to be that they don’t understand the 239 
numbers. But if they come to the aquarium and see the aquarium staff eating things in 240 
front of their eyes, they might think okay, it must be fine, there are lots of people who 241 
have started to eat fish again because of that. For example, before the disaster there 242 
was a guy who did rod fishing, caught the fish and ate them, but after the accident he 243 
stopped eating the fish. He said to me ‘I can’t eat the fish, can I?’ I said to him ‘I eat 244 
them, they’re delicious!’ 245 
 246 
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(marine scientist, local aquarium) 247 
 248 
people involved with farming and university students and [NAMES RESEARCH 249 
INSTITUTE] were doing a promotion where they talked about the research they can 250 
do to find out how much radioactive matter there is, what results are coming up and 251 
what they mean, so that one can feel relieved because this is what the researchers do. 252 
But of course you can’t just say it’s safe, you also have to say we sometimes get this 253 
result, which is bad because of this or that reason […] if the prefecture and the city 254 
hall say it’s safe, people don’t really trust them, but if they hear it from people like 255 
university students themselves the message can travel better. 256 
 257 
(disaster prevention professor, Fukushima City) 258 
 259 
The risk communicators here may be seen to be embedded within the community and hence 260 
exposed to any risks themselves. The aquarium scientists back up their claims to the safety of 261 
Fukushima seafood by consuming produce themselves, and students studying at a long-262 
established local university connect with farmers producing in the area to communicate with 263 
citizens on radiation monitoring methods. This tallies with other Fukushima-specific research 264 
suggesting that institutions operating at the local scale (Kimura and Katano, 2014; Morris-265 
Suzuki, 2014) may have a role to play in providing ‘trustworthy’ information on radiation. 266 
This may be especially true if these institutions are seen as distinct from national government 267 
or industry-led communication efforts aiming to ‘prove’ the safety of nuclear power for 268 
restarts or continued use (Sugiman, 2014). 269 
 270 
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We now address perceived competence. Participants were generally sceptical of any claims 271 
made by TEPCO, providing anecdotes about the plant when pressed on concerns about the 272 
coastal radiation situation going into the future: 273 
 274 
A labourer related to the work somewhere saw the noticeboard and got in touch. He 275 
only got paid eight thousand Yen a day. This person had no experience, the people 276 
around him had no experience. But this person was concreting under tanks for 277 
contaminated water – and he had no experience. 278 
 279 
(local politician, Iwaki City Hall) 280 
 281 
The thing that worries me is inside the nuclear power station, in case there is some 282 
kind of contamination or not. We don't know that, so that is a worry. 283 
   284 
(Iwaki City Fisheries Cooperative board member, Iwaki fisheries building (see also 285 
Mabon and Kawabe (2015)) 286 
 287 
People in their fifties, when the nuclear plant has been there since they were born, 288 
were saying it’s safe, it’s safe, it’s safe, in this area working for TEPCO was a status 289 
symbol, it was a good thing, for a lot of people it was almost a dream job. So there 290 
was a lot of trust in TEPCO, a lot of trust in the government. But that was a lie! The 291 
plant exploded! It was like a betrayal. 292 
 293 
(sociology professor, Fukushima City) 294 
 295 
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In the first two cases, anecdotal evidence about work on site at FDNPP is used to justify a 296 
cautious or sceptical stance towards information about environmental radioactivity provided 297 
by TEPCO. This anecdotal evidence is used to cast into doubt claims that the situation at the 298 
plant is under control, and thus to suggest information from the operator about radioactive 299 
releases from the plant cannot be fully trusted. A belief that the operator lacks competence 300 
translates into a lack of trustworthiness, which as the third quote indicates is intensified by the 301 
step-change in relationship between the operator and community since the disaster. 302 
 303 
The above data suggests that whilst a broad range of actors provide information about risk 304 
from radioactivity on the Fukushima coast, after McKechnie (2003) it may be those perceived 305 
as ‘insiders’ – local fishers and fisheries cooperatives, regional government employees 306 
working within communities, ‘local’ researchers – who are seen as more trustworthy due to 307 
their more direct exposure to any negative effects arising from risk management decisions. 308 
Also at play may be the perceived competence of the institution or individual, as illustrated by 309 
the use of anecdotes to question TEPCO’s ability to understand and manage risks from 310 
FDNPP. What the ultimate goal of these actors’ risk communication efforts is – and how in 311 
particular they handle uncertainty – is the subject of the next section. 312 
 313 
4.2. What is the goal of engagement on uncertainty and complexity? 314 
 315 
We now address whether the goal of specific risk communication initiatives is to 'convince' 316 
people about the safety of produce or environments, or to help people come to an informed 317 
decision of their own on what course of action to take. A key issue in Fukushima – echoing 318 
Turcanu et al (2016) for environmental radioactivity and Kasperson (2014) more broadly – is 319 
responding to differing interpretations of uncertainty depending on people’s value systems. 320 
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Post-disaster, the concept of fuhyo higai (usually translated as ‘harmful rumours’, e.g. Wada 321 
et al, 2013; Kawazoe et al, 2014) has been deployed by national and regional governments. 322 
The implication of fuhyo higai is that economic harm to Fukushima’s produce and tourism 323 
stems from a lack of consumer information, and that more and/or better education is required 324 
to dispel such baseless rumours. Kimura and Katano (2014) however hold that labelling those 325 
with a cautious stance towards the safety of produce as somehow unsupportive towards 326 
recovery may overlook the heterogeneity of risk perceptions existing within communities or 327 
even families. This continuing diversity of opinion, even as more information on radiation in 328 
produce has become available, came across when interviewees involved in fisheries were 329 
asked to narrate the process of restarting operations post-disaster: 330 
 331 
Of course there was the nuclear plant situation, and every month we would meet. 332 
When will it be safe again, naturally the nuclear plant situation was still a worry, can 333 
we fish in the future ever again, the discussions on compensation were at stake […] At 334 
the beginning the anxiety was a lot stronger and we had to respect those opinions. 335 
 336 
(Iwaki City Fisheries Cooperative board member, Iwaki fisheries building) 337 
 338 
Now monitoring has been undertaken that says the fish are safe and we can buy things 339 
in the shops, there are people who buy the fish without worrying. But there are also 340 
people who don’t. It’s not that they don’t have trust, just that some people are still 341 
worried. When I’m working in the office, I have the feeling we are getting fewer 342 
inquiries and questions, there are fewer phone calls from people asking if the fish are 343 
safe or not. People that will buy the fish will buy them. People that won’t, won’t ask 344 
and won’t buy. 345 
16 
 
 346 
(senior researcher, Fukushima Prefecture Fisheries Research Station, Onahama) 347 
 348 
Rather than attempting to convince consumers of the safety of produce, the response to this 349 
division for coastal fisheries at least appears to be provision of information on monitoring 350 
processes and data to allow consumers to reach their own decision on whether or not to buy 351 
locally-caught fish. For instance, results are uploaded to a publicly-viewable website where 352 
the monitoring process itself is explained (Fukushima Prefecture Federation of Fisheries 353 
Cooperative Associations, 2016). Moreover, the first quote also demonstrates the importance 354 
of respect for risk communicators in such situations. Rather than dismissing more cautious 355 
standpoints as 'irrational' or harmful, respect is given to the possibility that people may 356 
interpret uncertainties and risks differently, or hold legitimate concerns stemming from their 357 
values and world views. 358 
 359 
Part of such respect may be realisation that even if initial awareness is low, people can in 360 
certain situations quickly come to terms with complexity and live within uncertainties 361 
(Katsukawa, 2012). When asked what citizens found difficult to understand about radiation, a 362 
leader within Fukushima's radiation monitoring team argued citizens’ awareness of the 363 
surrounding environment has risen post-disaster: 364 
 365 
If people look at the [radiation] monitors they can understand the number. Before the 366 
accident, residents of Fukushima Prefecture understandably didn’t know very much 367 
about radiation, after the accident the highest level we would see inside Fukushima 368 
City was 20 microSieverts per hour. Compared to now, we now get 0.3 or 0.4, so 369 
people can look at the readings every day and feel they are safe. If the display stops 370 
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working, they’ll be on the phone to us right away! […] There is information about it 371 
everywhere in the environment around you, on TV, newspapers, there are lots of 372 
occasions to come across the radiation level, so it has become part of daily life. 373 
 374 
(Fukushima Prefecture radiation monitoring team leader, Fukushima City) 375 
 376 
A scientist and communicator similarly responded that given appropriate space and time, 377 
citizens can understand even seemingly complex issues: 378 
 379 
There is nothing that is particularly difficult to explain if you can take time. If people 380 
are willing to listen and you have time to explain slowly and in a way that is easy to 381 
understand, nearly everyone will come to understand it. But you have to create the 382 
chances to do that, which is perhaps very difficult. The most difficult thing is people 383 
who are not interested, people who don’t want to eat, who are a bit concerned but are 384 
not actively looking for information. How do you get information to people like that? 385 
 386 
(marine scientist, local aquarium) 387 
 388 
Publics and stakeholders can quickly become aware of the complexities in measuring 389 
environmental radioactivity, understand the difficulty of making generalised conclusions, and 390 
be able to accept that the radiation situation remains dynamic over time. People may thus not 391 
expect/trust there to be no radiation in the environment, or that scientists and authorities 392 
completely understand the variations in radioactive contamination that can occur across short 393 
distances. Rather, what may be sought is evidence of adequate monitoring procedures and 394 
contingency plans for what to do should high levels of radioactivity through different 395 
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pathways be discovered. Blanket assurances about safety could even arouse suspicion or 396 
distrust (Kimura and Katano, 2014). Participants asked to expand on how they dealt with 397 
uncertainties in risk communication frequently admitted to the limitations of their knowledge, 398 
and acknowledged the importance of allowing citizens and stakeholders to make their own 399 
informed judgments based on interpretations of uncertainty: 400 
 401 
No matter how much you say to people who won’t eat food that it’s okay, it’s safe they 402 
won’t really eat it. You can’t really force people like that to eat […] people will go to 403 
the supermarket and won’t eat Fukushima produce, but will go out to a restaurant and 404 
eat things without really knowing where they’ve come from, that’s maybe more 405 
dangerous. So I hope this can be good opportunity to teach people to understand their 406 
food and to think about where their food comes from, so they can decide for 407 
themselves based on correct information. 408 
 409 
(disaster prevention professor, Fukushima City) 410 
 411 
I don’t know overall, but there are some areas where the radiation levels are higher, 412 
for forestry where workers have to go into the mountains and spend a long time there, 413 
we are thinking about how we can reduce the exposure by considering various 414 
decontamination processes, but the forest is big with very complex and variable 415 
vegetation so it is not easy to decontaminate. 416 
 417 
(Fukushima Prefecture radiation monitoring team leader, Fukushima City) 418 
 419 
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If data only came out that said everything was safe nobody would trust it, so we need 420 
to be able to clearly say this is no good, that is no good […] our role is to explain 421 
things, so we have a responsibility to explain not only what is bad and good and what 422 
the numbers are, but also what would happen if you ate certain fish and why it is that 423 
some things are off-limits. 424 
 425 
(marine scientist, local aquarium) 426 
 427 
Evident is the admission of the limitations of current knowledge and also an acceptance of the 428 
complexity of ecosystems. Previous research in the context of Fukushima (Katsukawa, 2012; 429 
Kimura and Katano, 2014; Mabon and Kawabe, 2015) has similarly shown that such honesty 430 
may offer a more nuanced pathway to restoring public faith, and that experts and decision-431 
makers should thus not be hesitant in admitting where areas for further research may lie. 432 
 433 
Clear here is that engagement on risk and uncertainty with the goal of allowing citizens and 434 
stakeholders to come to their own informed decision on a particular course of action may 435 
ultimately be more effective than attempts to ‘convince’ people or ‘dispel’ myths. The above 436 
data also suggest there is value for those tasked with communicating the physical nature of 437 
environmental radioactivity in openly discussing limitations of existing knowledge and the 438 
steps being taken to improve this knowledge. Citizens and stakeholders alike may accept 439 
uncertainty under highly complex conditions, perhaps even being suspicious of blanket 440 
assurances to knowledge. In turn, there is a need when communicating potential risk 441 
management strategies to respect legitimate concerns grounded in interpretations of 442 
uncertainty, and not to dismiss public or stakeholder concerns offhand. Moving beyond the 443 
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idea of risk communication as purely the one-way ‘correction’ of misunderstandings is the 444 
aim of the next section. 445 
 446 
4.3. Is the nature of risk communication responsive to risk bearers’ requirements? If not, 447 
how may it become so? 448 
 449 
Arvai (2014) expresses concern that the aim of much risk communication is still to correct 450 
misunderstandings or bring perceptions in line with a dominant ideological framing. 451 
Kasperson (2014) adds that conditions of high social distrust may require more inclusive and 452 
deliberative forms of risk communication. This section builds on these challenges and the 453 
points raised at the end of Section 4.2 to consider how risk communication on Fukushima’s 454 
coasts may (or may not) be responsive to the actual needs of publics and stakeholders. 455 
 456 
First, however, it is important to remember that respect for different framings of uncertainty 457 
and acknowledging limitations to knowledge does not mean 'anything goes'. Potentially 458 
harmful radiation was and continues to be emitted from FDNPP, with a general high-level 459 
understanding of how radiation is distributed across space (Saito et al, 2015). There is 460 
therefore place for the work McKinley et al (2011) identify around effectively communicating 461 
the underpinning scientific data on radioactive contamination and contextualising the effects 462 
of events like the Fukushima disaster. Nonetheless, on the theme of respect there is a parallel 463 
need to create space for publics and stakeholders to air their own concerns and monitoring 464 
requirements. Discussion on the underpinning scientific and policy principles without such 465 
opportunity may lead to disenfranchisement: 466 
 467 
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[I]nformation meetings are held. They explain compensation, exchange on the future 468 
of towns and villages, ask people to gather together and so they can hear their 469 
opinions. But no matter what they say, it’s a terribly difficult situation that is not 470 
going well, so no matter what the town or the prefecture or the government says 471 
people’s own lives are not recovering. There is a feeling that attending is a waste of 472 
time. 473 
 474 
(sociology professor, Fukushima City) 475 
 476 
Given the trust issues outlined in Section 4.1, work to rebuild citizen trust in measures taken 477 
by ‘government’ across a range of scales may be required to avoid disengagement of this 478 
nature. Interviewed Fukushima Prefecture staff did acknowledge this, explaining that based 479 
on concerns raised during surveys with prefectural residents they are now working with 480 
citizens with different activity patterns to estimate more fully the exposure received through 481 
daily living. This ‘building in’ of public and stakeholder concerns to monitoring emerged in 482 
other interviewed institutions’ narratives of how they collected data about radioactivity: 483 
 484 
Fishers catch fish and bring them here, in the lab we process the fish for monitoring, 485 
take only the meat and bring it into the lab. When the results come in, first of all we 486 
explain the data to the fishers who have brought us the samples, so they can know 487 
where the level is high, the level of danger in their fish. 488 
 489 
(fisheries resources manager, Fukushima Prefecture Fisheries Research Station, 490 
Onahama) 491 
 492 
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After the accident, first of all we wanted to check for ourselves. There were lots of 493 
people who couldn’t trust the national government or the prefectural government’s 494 
research, so the aquarium has a role to release monitoring information that could be 495 
seen as independent and like a ‘double check’ […] we have been working with the 496 
UmiLabo people to run an event called TabeLabo, which means researching so that 497 
we can eat! 498 
 499 
(marine scientist, local aquarium) 500 
 501 
Citizens or stakeholders can actively collect environmental radioactivity data - for land-based 502 
radiation, citizens with different lifestyles and movement patterns play a role in creating more 503 
nuanced data on the exposure people may receive as they go about their daily routines. For 504 
marine radiation, fishers' skills and machinery are utilised to catch more fish samples than 505 
would be possible were the prefectural researchers to use their equipment alone. In the 506 
‘TabeLabo’ events run at the aquarium in conjunction with local non-governmental 507 
organisation UmiLabo, publics get involved in catching fish themselves, viewing radiation 508 
monitoring processes for fish, and eating local produce. This ‘citizen fishing’ creates 509 
additional data which helps to keep a check on government radiation statistics (UmiLabo, 510 
2015). Involving a wider range of actors in data collection in this way has instrumental value 511 
in allowing more data to be collected on which to base decisions about environmental 512 
radiation. Further, the spaces, opportunities and conditions of mutual understanding required 513 
for more dialogic forms of risk governance to emerge may be created as a result. 514 
 515 
Beyond communication needs, dialogic processes may additionally play a role in debating the 516 
nature and pace of remediation and recovery along Fukushima’s coast. This was illustrated by 517 
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how two participants responded when pressed on what they saw as the purpose and value of 518 
their engagement on risk: 519 
 520 
We explain the current situation at a meeting which includes quite high-up people 521 
from fisheries and also the fishers who are doing the trial fisheries or want to take 522 
part in trial fisheries. Probably either us or people from the prefecture, I mean public 523 
sector, will explain the current situation, these fish are still high, these fish have 524 
become lower. We discuss if the fishers wanted to fish again, this is the route they 525 
would take to get there. 526 
 527 
(fisheries resources manager, Onahama Fisheries Research Station) 528 
 529 
Town hall staff also talked about how they didn’t know what would happen next. 530 
There are no resources to make a decision about what to do in the future. Staff and 531 
citizens both said the thing that worried them most was not knowing what would 532 
happen in the future. 533 
 534 
(sociology professor, Fukushima City) 535 
 536 
Here, more than measuring radiation and associated risks, input from stakeholders is used to 537 
suggest what actions are to be taken next given the available information. Based on the 538 
newest data (which fishers themselves have produced) fishers are involved in discussions over 539 
which fish should be targeted for the resumption of sale. Residents of an evacuated town are 540 
able to raise issues they themselves feel are of concern, with local government staff too given 541 
a chance to air their views as citizens (albeit to a research project rather than a direct planning 542 
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consultation). Yet in order for this kind of discussion to emerge it is crucial for the involved 543 
parties to have a space where they feel they can air their concerns. In the case of fishers, this 544 
is an informal meeting with opportunity for discussion with civil servants before and after. 545 
For the residents, it is a closed discussion with facilitators perceived as non-judgmental and 546 
not overly invested in the decision reached. 547 
 548 
Our data indicates more ‘top down’ modes of risk communication may miss what publics and 549 
stakeholders feel they actually need to know about environmental radioactivity, especially if 550 
trust in authorities and operators viewed as managing or communicating the risk is already 551 
low. At the same time, environmental radioactivity is real and potentially very harmful, and 552 
decisions do ultimately have to be taken about remediation, rehabilitation and consumption. 553 
The initiatives identified here that involve publics and stakeholders in data collection may 554 
therefore have value in building a wider and more ‘independent’ evidence base for decision-555 
making at all scales. Collaborative data collection may also help to foster the kind of 556 
relationships required for dialogic discussions over future directions for remediation and 557 
monitoring to take place. 558 
 559 
5. Discussion 560 
 561 
We finish by considering our findings in light of the four principles for future risk 562 
communication laid down by Kasperson (2014). We draw links between Kasperson’s 563 
thoughts and our findings to illustrate ongoing challenges for engagement on risk and 564 
uncertainty. We also reflect on future directions for Fukushima-specific and wider 565 
environmental risk research raised by this study. 566 
 567 
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Kasperson’s first principle is that ‘[r]isk communication programs need to be more sustained 568 
over time, better funded, and more ambitious in the goals adopted and the outcomes sought’ 569 
(Kasperson, 2014: 1237). Environmental radioactive contamination of the kind found in 570 
Fukushima will retain potential to harm humans for many years. The complexity of land and 571 
marine ecosystems makes it difficult to know how radioactive material will travel long-term 572 
and if/how this may ultimately affect humans. Continuing uncertainties around longer-term 573 
effects of low-level exposure across a range of pathways further demonstrate the need for 574 
continued monitoring into the future. A lesson that can be drawn in support of Kasperson’s 575 
first principle is the importance of those responsible for the management of environmental 576 
radioactivity, especially national/regional government and plant operators, building 577 
understanding of the timeframes over which citizens and stakeholders envision the issues at 578 
hand and ensuring the timeframes of their risk communication strategies match accordingly. 579 
The incremental restarts adopted by fisheries cooperatives, and Sato’s (2014) identification 580 
that evacuated residents within Fukushima imagined resettlement over a period of thirty years 581 
(as opposed to the central government’s five years), illustrate that publics and stakeholders 582 
may envision responses to risks stretching over decadal timescales. Sustaining risk 583 
communication programmes over time in the way Kasperson imagines may hence require risk 584 
managers and/or decision-makers taking steps to align their communication programmes with 585 
citizen expectations of the timeframe over which risk governance is to take place. 586 
 587 
Kasperson secondly states ‘risk communication should be broadened to internalize conflicting 588 
issues of concern and decision-makers should deepen their analysis to address the embedding 589 
of risk issues in value and lifestyle structures’ (Kasperson, 2014: 1237). This is illustrated 590 
through concerns over how well existing governance regimes for Fukushima radiation reflect 591 
the exposure people receive through daily living (Morris-Suzuki, 2014), and through 592 
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emerging awareness at local government level of the need to more fully understand the 593 
heterogeneity of lifestyles as discussed previously. What our data and other social research on 594 
Fukushima radiation add is the importance of taking seriously the socio-cultural implications 595 
of being exposed to risk. Sato (2014) coins the phrase ‘evacuated in daily life’ to describe the 596 
effect of living in environs subject to restrictions on daily doings such as consumption of food. 597 
Issues around recreational activity in the countryside, and the desire of fishers to be back out 598 
fishing (Mabon and Kawabe, 2015), demonstrate how potential exposure to risk can affect 599 
ability to undertake socially or culturally meaningful practices. As per Kasperson’s second 600 
principle, then, it may be that regulators’ and operators’ conceptualisation of ‘risk’ needs to 601 
extend beyond techno-scientific risks to encompass implications for citizens’ daily practices 602 
and the possibility of exposure to risk restricting or affecting culturally significant practices. 603 
 604 
Kasperson’s third principle is that ‘[i]f uncertainties are large and deeply embedded, more 605 
communication will be needed, particularly that regarding those uncertainties that really 606 
matter in risk terms and not the full catalogue of uncertainties that scientists uncover. 607 
Attention will also be needed to identify which uncertainties can and cannot be reduced over 608 
time and within what time frames’ (Kasperson, 2014: 1238). We add to this the importance of 609 
scientists, decision-makers and operators perceived as taking or assessing the risks being 610 
honest about where uncertainties remain, and demonstrating competence to work under 611 
conditions of uncertainty. Fisheries cooperatives, working towards incremental restarts based 612 
on stringent screening of produce where both results and the monitoring process are open to 613 
scrutiny, seem able to garner some support from buyers and consumers. Conversely, 614 
anecdotal evidence about FDNPP itself is deployed to cast doubt on the competence of the 615 
plant operator to manage and respond to uncertainties. To build on Kasperson’s argument 616 
about the need for more communication if uncertainties are large and deeply embedded, it 617 
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may also be that people can in cases accept and understand uncertainty provided adequate 618 
monitoring and remediation procedures are in place, and that sufficient attention has been 619 
given to ‘worst-case’ scenarios. Publics and stakeholders may not expect there to be no 620 
uncertainty, with assurances to this extent even arousing suspicion or distrust. However, 621 
evidence is required that steps are being taken by those assessing or taking the risks to 622 
monitor and consider the potential effects of uncertainties. 623 
 624 
Fourth and final is Kasperson’s view that ‘where high social distrust prevails, and this is 625 
increasingly common, a thorough revamping of the goals, structure, and conduct of risk 626 
communication will be needed’ (Kasperson, 2014: 1238). Our data reinforces the significance 627 
of how the person or institution ‘communicating’ information about risk is perceived. One 628 
driver in this regard is the motives of the engaging individual or institution - whether they 629 
stand to benefit from quickly taking decisions on risk instead of a more cautious and 630 
incremental approach. A second is whether the communicator will themselves have to bear 631 
any risks from the decision taken, either to their own health or to their long-term livelihood. 632 
And a third, as above, is the perceived transparency and competence of the institution. Adding 633 
to Kasperson, therefore, is the value of drawing local-level actors into risk communication 634 
and engagement. The reason for this is that those operating at the local scale may be viewed 635 
as citizens exposed to the same risks as the surrounding community, and thus as having a 636 
personal stake in the outcome of risk governance decisions. By contrast, national governments, 637 
large utility operators or even spatially distant ‘experts’ could be thought of as coming from 638 
afar to pass detached judgment. 639 
 640 
We lastly discuss limitations of the study and directions for future research. As noted in 641 
Section 3, the iterative and highly qualitative data analysis technique deployed in this paper 642 
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makes quantifying the reliability of the analysis by assessing inter-rater reliability difficult. 643 
We nevertheless believe there is value in analysis techniques that afford the researcher greater 644 
interpretative flexibility given the overarching concern with avoiding assumptions about how 645 
risk bearers will perceive or respond to risks. However, this does raise a wider issue about 646 
interpretative ‘reliability’ and translation in risk research – especially when members of the 647 
research team speak different native languages. Although no translation challenges arose 648 
within this study, following Gawlewicz’s (2016) procedure for ‘conceptual equivalence’ 649 
(adding notations to the transcript to explain concepts that cannot be directly translated) may 650 
form a useful component of subsequent, more systematic data analysis. This would allow 651 
issues such as consistency of or differences in the researchers’ interpretations across 652 
languages and cultures to be assessed. 653 
 654 
6. Conclusion 655 
 656 
Acknowledging radiation risk perception is socially and culturally contingent does not mean 657 
‘anything goes’ – radiation certainly is harmful or even lethal. But indeterminacies and 658 
uncertainties remain around the overall effects on humans of environmental radioactivity 659 
associated with the FDNPP accident, meaning decisions have to be taken under conditions of 660 
uncertainty. Issues of energy and environment go right to the heart of how people may live 661 
their lives. Both publics’ and stakeholders’ responses to communication and the decisions 662 
they make on indeterminacies, uncertainties or ‘facts’ may hence be guided by their 663 
underpinning values. We have sketched out challenges we see on Fukushima’s coast for 664 
working with these value-laden dimensions, so that (a) citizens and stakeholders may use their 665 
own values and world views to make judgements based on an understanding of where 666 
uncertainties and indeterminacies remain; and (b) risk management by governments at all 667 
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scales, researchers and operators in terms of communication and monitoring can evolve over 668 
time in order to take into account what members of society actually require and how they feel 669 
about risk and uncertainty. 670 
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